top of page
perceptive_background_267k.jpg

New DOUBLECUP ClickFix service hides malware in browser cache images

Published:

3 augustus 2026 om 20:01:22

Alert date:

3 augustus 2026 om 21:04:01

Source:

bleepingcomputer.com

Click to open the original link from this advisory

Ransomware & Malware, Web Technologies, Enterprise Applications

A new Russian loader-as-a-service called DOUBLECUP leverages ClickFix attack techniques to conceal malicious code within PNG images cached by victims' browsers. The service targets both Windows and macOS systems, delivering a payload known as CountLoader. On Windows systems, it additionally deploys a new remote access trojan called DeviceManager. The malware is distributed through a loader-as-a-service model, suggesting a commercial or organized criminal operation. The use of browser cache images as a hiding mechanism represents a notable evasion technique to bypass traditional security controls. This campaign highlights an evolution in ClickFix-style social engineering attacks combined with steganography-like concealment in image files.

Technical details

DOUBLECUP is a Russian loader-as-a-service (LaaS) that has operated since early June 2026. It uses ClickFix social engineering attacks combined with steganography to hide malicious code inside PNG images that are cached by victims' browsers. The service provides customers with a Go-based Windows tool for creating malicious campaigns and generating frontend code to embed in attacker-controlled websites. The infrastructure includes hosting steganographic PNG images, managing session and signal endpoints, providing encryption keys, and automatically rebuilding payloads. Attack flow: (1) Victim visits a fake site impersonating NetSuite, Odoo, HubSpot, or Salesforce via embedded iframes displaying fake CAPTCHA prompts. (2) DOUBLECUP registers the session, determines the victim's public IP, and forces the browser to download and cache a malicious PNG image. (3) The fake CAPTCHA instructs the victim to paste and execute a command that was silently copied to the clipboard. (4) The command searches the browser cache for the PNG by exact file size, then uses 'findstr' or 'certutil' to recover and execute the hidden first-stage payload inside the image. (5) The first payload launches a fileless second-stage dropper, which retrieves the victim's public IPv4 address to create a decryption key for the final encrypted payload. (6) After verifying the decrypted payload against a hardcoded SHA-256 hash, it is executed in memory. Final payloads delivered are CountLoader and DeviceManager RAT. CountLoader harvests system information, checks for cryptocurrency wallet apps and browser extensions, checks for Signal Desktop, establishes persistence via scheduled tasks, and can download/execute MSI packages, PowerShell modules, and DLLs. A macOS version is compiled for Intel and Apple Silicon and installs a LaunchAgent for persistence using curl, sw_vers, system_profiler, and ioreg. DeviceManager is a modular Python-based Windows RAT that uses EtherHiding — blockchain smart contracts on Ethereum or Polygon — to dynamically retrieve its C2 server address, making it resilient to takedowns. It collects machine GUID, disk identifier, user SID, hostname, username, OS version, architecture, installed AV software, and domain info. It uses DNS A and TXT records to steal data, retrieve commands, download payloads, and exfiltrate output. Browsers targeted include Chrome, Edge, Firefox, Brave, and Opera. The service skips systems in CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) countries.

Mitigation steps:

1. Block or monitor the known malicious IP 213[.]139.77[.]109 at the network perimeter. 2. Educate users about ClickFix social engineering attacks — warn them never to paste or execute commands prompted by websites, especially fake CAPTCHA pages. 3. Monitor for suspicious use of certutil and findstr commands, particularly when referencing browser cache directories. 4. Implement endpoint detection rules for fileless execution patterns and in-memory payload execution. 5. Monitor for scheduled task creation and LaunchAgent installation by non-standard processes. 6. Block or alert on DNS TXT record queries from endpoints, as DeviceManager uses DNS TXT for C2 communication. 7. Monitor for outbound connections to Ethereum/Polygon blockchain RPC endpoints from non-browser processes (EtherHiding technique). 8. Inspect browser cache directories for anomalous PNG files, particularly those matched by exact file size during script execution. 9. Deploy browser security policies to restrict clipboard access by web pages where possible. 10. Alert on PowerShell, MSI, and DLL downloads initiated by unusual parent processes. 11. Use threat intelligence feeds to detect CountLoader and DeviceManager indicators. 12. Verify that endpoint security tools detect Python-based RATs and Go-based loaders. 13. Consider blocking iframe-based redirects to login pages impersonating NetSuite, Odoo, HubSpot, and Salesforce.

Affected products:

Google Chrome (browser)
Microsoft Edge (browser)
Mozilla Firefox (browser)
Brave (browser)
Opera (browser)
Windows (OS)
macOS (Intel and Apple Silicon)
NetSuite (impersonated)
Odoo (impersonated)
HubSpot (impersonated)
Salesforce (impersonated)

Related links:

Related CVE's:

Related threat actors:

IOC's:

IP: 213[.]139.77[.]109:9090 (DOUBLECUP open directory and licensing panel), Malware: CountLoader (Windows and macOS infostealer/dropper), Malware: DeviceManager RAT (Python-based modular Windows RAT), Technique: Steganographic PNG images used to conceal payloads in browser cache, Technique: EtherHiding via Ethereum/Polygon smart contracts for C2 resolution, Technique: DNS A and TXT records used for C2 communication, Commands: findstr and certutil used to extract payload from cached PNG, Persistence: Scheduled tasks (Windows), LaunchAgent (macOS)

This article was created with the assistance of AI technology by Perceptive.

© 2025 by Perceptive Security. All rights reserved.

email: info@perceptivesecurity.com

Deze website toont informatie afkomstig van externe bronnen; Perceptive aanvaardt geen verantwoordelijkheid voor de juistheid, volledigheid of actualiteit van deze informatie.

bottom of page